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Abstract. Recent years have seen significant interest in designing networks that
are self-healing in the sense that they can automatically recover from adversarial
attacks. Previous work shows that it is possible for a network to automatically
recover, even when an adversary repeatedly deletes nodes in the network. How-
ever, there have not yet been any algorithms that self-heal in the case where an
adversary takes over nodes in the network. In this paper, we address this gap.
In particular, we describe a communication network over n nodes that ensures
the following properties, even when an adversary controls up to t ≤ (1/8− )n
nodes, for any non-negative . First, the network provides a point-to-point com-
munication with bandwidth and latency costs that are asymptotically optimal.
Second, the expected total number of message corruptions is O(t(log∗ n)2) be-
fore the adversarially controlled nodes are effectively quarantined so that they
cause no more corruptions. Empirical results show that our algorithm can reduce
the bandwidth cost by up to a factor of 70.
Keywords: Byzantine Faults, Threshold Cryptography, Self-Healing Algorithms.
“Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” - English proverb
1 Introduction
Self-healing algorithms protect critical properties of a network, even when that network
is under repeated attack. Such algorithms only expend resources when it is necessary
to repair damage done by an attacker. Thus, they provide significant resource savings
when compared to traditional robust algorithms, which expend significant resources
even when the network is not under attack.
The last several years have seen exciting results in the design of self-healing algo-
rithms [2,18,9,10,17,3]. Unfortunately, none of these previous results handle Byzantine
faults, where an adversary takes over nodes in the network and can cause them to devi-
ate arbitrarily from the protocol. This is a significant gap, since traditional Byzantine-
resilient algorithms are notoriously inefficient, and the self-healing approach could sig-
nificantly improve efficiency.
In this paper, we take a step towards addressing this gap. For a network of n nodes,
we design self-healing algorithms for communication that tolerate up to 1/8 fraction of
Byzantine faults. Our algorithms enable any node to send a message to any other node
in the network with bandwidth and latency costs that are asymptotically optimal.
? Eligible for Best Student Paper Award (George Saad is a full-time student).
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Moreover, our algorithms limit the expected total number of message corruptions.
Ideally, each Byzantine node would cause O(1) corruptions; our result is that each
Byzantine node causes an expected O((log∗ n)2) corruptions. 1 Now we must amend
our initial proverb to: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me ω((log∗ n)2) times, shame
on me.”.
1.1 Our Model
We assume an adversary that is static in the sense that it takes over nodes before the al-
gorithm begins. The nodes that are compromised by the adversary are bad, and the other
nodes are good. The bad nodes may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, by sending
no messages, excessive numbers of messages, incorrect messages, or any combination
of these. The good nodes follow the protocol. We assume that the adversary knows our
protocol, but is unaware of the random bits of the good nodes.
We further assume that each node has a unique ID. We say that node p has a link to
node q if p knows q’s ID and can thus directly communicate with node q. Also, we as-
sume the existence of a public key digital signature scheme, and thus a computationally
bounded adversary. Finally, we assume a partially synchronous communication model:
any message sent from one good node to another good node requires at most h time
steps to be sent and received, and the value h is known to all nodes. Also, we allow for
the adversary to be rushing, where the bad nodes receive all messages from good nodes
in a round before sending out their own messages.
Our algorithms make critical use of quorums and a quorum graph. We define a quo-
rum to be a set of θ(log n) nodes, of which at most 1/8-fraction are bad. Many results
show how to create and maintain a network of quorums [6,11,16,20,7,1,14]. All of these
results maintain what we will call a quorum graph in which each vertex represents a
quorum. The properties of the quorum graph are: 1) each node is in O(log n) quorums;
2) for any quorum Q, any node in Q can communicate directly to any other node in Q;
and 3) for any quorums Qi and Qj that are connected in the quorum graph, any node in
Qi can communicate directly with any node inQj and vice versa. Moreover, we assume
that for any two nodes x and y in a quorum, node x knows all quorums that node y is
in.
The communication in the quorum graph typically occurs as follows. When a node s
sends another node r some messagem, there is a canonical quorum path,Q1, Q2, . . . , Q`,
through the quorum graph. This path is determined by the ID’s of both s and r. A naive
way to route the message is for s to send m to all nodes in Q1. Then for i = 1 to `− 1,
for all nodes in Qi to send m to all nodes in Qi+1, and for each node in Qi+1 to do ma-
jority filtering on the messages received in order to determine the true value of m. Then
all nodes in Q` send m to node r that does a majority filter on the received messages.
Unfortunately, this algorithm requiresO(` log2 n) messages and a latency ofO(`). This
paper shows how to reduce the message cost to O(`+ log n), in an amortized sense.
1 Recall that log∗ n or the iterated logarithm function is the number of times logarithm must be
applied iteratively before the result is less than or equal to 1. It is an extremely slowly growing
function: e.g. log∗ 1010 = 5.
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As we show in Section 4, this reduction can be large in practice. In particular, we
reduce the bandwidth cost by a factor of 58 for n = 14,116, and by a factor of 70 for
n = 30,509.
1.2 Our Results
This paper provides a self-healing algorithm, SEND, that sends a message from a source
node to a target node in the network. Our main result is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume we have a network with n nodes and t ≤ (1/8 − )n bad nodes,
for any non-negative , and a quorum graph as described above. Then our algorithm
ensures the following.
– For any call to SEND, the expected number of messages is O(` + log n) and the
expected latency is O(`), in an amortized sense.2
– The expected total number of times that SEND fails to deliver a message reliably is
at most 3t(log∗ n)2.
The proof of this theorem is deferred to appendix A due to space constraints.
1.3 Related Work
Several papers [8,12,15,21,22] have discussed different restoration mechanisms to pre-
serve network performance by adding capacity and rerouting traffic streams in the
presence of node or link failures. They present mathematical models to determine
global optimal restoration paths, and provide methods for capacity optimization of path-
restorable networks.
Our results are inspired by recent work on self-healing algorithms [2,18,9,10,17,3].
A common model for these results is that the following process repeats indefinitely: an
adversary deletes some nodes in the network, and the algorithm adds edges. The algo-
rithm is constrained to never increase the degree of any node by more than a logarith-
mic factor from its original degree. In this model, researchers have presented algorithms
that ensure the following properties: the network stays connected and the diameter does
not increase by much [2,18,9]; the shortest path between any pair of nodes does not
increase by much [10]; and expansion properties of the network are approximately pre-
served [17].
Our results are also similar in spirit to those of Saia and Young [19] and Young
et al. [23], which both show how to reduce message complexity when transmitting a
message across a quorum path of length `. The first result, [19], achieves expected
message complexity of O(` log n) by use of bipartite expanders. However, this result is
impractical due to high hidden constants and high setup costs. The second result, [23],
2 In particular, if we perform any number of message sends through quorum paths, where `M
is the longest such path, and L is the sum of the quorums traversed in all such paths, then the
expected total number of messages sent will be O(L + t · (`M log2 n + log5 n)). Note that,
since t is fixed, for large L, the expected total number of messages is O(L).
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achieves expected message complexity of O(`). However, this second result requires
the sender to iteratively contact a member of each quorum in the quorum path.
As mentioned earlier, several peer-to-peer networks have been described that prov-
ably enable reliable communication, even in the face of adversarial attack [6,4,11,16,20,1].
To the best of our knowledge, our approach applies to each of these networks, with the
exception of [4]. In particular, we can apply our algorithms to asymptotically improve
the efficiency of the peer-to-peer networks from [6,11,16,20,1].
Similarly to Young et al. [24], we use threshold cryptography as an alternative to
Byzantine Agreement.
1.4 Organization of Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our algorithms.
The analysis of our algorithms is shown in Section 3. Section 4 gives empirical results
showing how our algorithms can improve the efficiency of the butterfly networks of [6].
Finally, we conclude and describe problems for future work in Section 5.
2 Our Algorithms
In this section, we describe our algorithms: BROADCAST, SEND, SEND-PATH, CHECK
and UPDATE.
2.1 Overview
Recall that when node s wants to send a message to a node r, there is a canonical
quorum path Q1, Q2, . . . , Q`, determined by the IDs of s and r. We assume that Q1 is
the leftmost quorum and Q` is the rightmost quorum; and we let |Qj | be the number of
nodes in quorum Qj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ `.
The objective of our algorithms is marking all bad nodes in the network, where no
more message corruption occurred. In order to do that, we mark nodes after they are
in conflict, where a pair of nodes is in conflict if at least one of these nodes accuses
the other node in this pair. If the half of nodes in any quorum are marked, we unmark
these nodes. Note that when we mark (or unmark) a node, it is marked (or unmarked)
in its quorums and in their neighboring quorums. Note that all nodes in the network are
initially unmarked.
In our algorithms, we assume that when any node x broadcasts a messagem to a set
of nodes S, it executes BROADCAST (m,S). Before discussing our main algorithm,
SEND, we describe BROADCAST procedure (Algorithm 1).
In BROADCAST, we make use of the threshold cryptography as an alternative to
Byzantine Agreement. We briefly describe the threshold cryptography, (η, d)-threshold
scheme.
Threshold Cryptography. In (η, d)-threshold scheme, the secret key is distributed
among η parties, and any subset of more than d parties can jointly reassemble the key.
The secret key can be distributed by a completely distributed approach, Distributed Key
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Algorithm 1 BROADCAST (m,S)
Declarations: BROADCAST is being called by a node x in a quorumQ in order to send a message
m to a set of nodes S.
1. Node x sends message m to all nodes in Q.
2. Each node inQ signsm by its private key share to obtain a signed-message share, and sends
this signed-message share back to node x.
3. Node x interpolates at least 7|Q|
8
of the received signed-message shares to obtain the signed-
message of Q.
4. Node x sends the signed-message of Q to all nodes in S.
Algorithm 2 SEND(m, r)
Declaration: node s wants to send message m to node r.
1. Node s calls SEND-PATH (m, r).
2. With probability pcall, node s calls CHECK (m, r).
Generation (DKG) [13]. The Distributed Key Generation (DKG) generates the pub-
lic/private key shares of all nodes in every quorum and the public/private key pair of
each quorum. The public key share of any node is known only to the nodes that are in
the same quorum. Moreover, the public key of each quorum is known to all nodes of this
quorum and its neighboring quorums, but the private key of any quorum is unknown to
all nodes.
BROADCAST Algorithm. InBROADCAST (m,S), we use in particular a (|Q|, 78 |Q|−
1)-threshold scheme, where |Q| is the quorum size. When a node x in a quorum Q calls
BROADCAST (m,S) to broadcast a message m to a set of nodes S, firstly node x
sends m to all nodes in Q. Then each node in the quorum signs m by its private key
share, and sends the signed message share to node x. Node x interpolates at least 7|Q|8
of the received signed-message shares to construct a signed-message of the quorum. We
know that at least 7/8-fraction of the nodes in any quorum are good. So if this signed-
message is constructed, it ensures that at least 7/8-fraction of the nodes in this quorum
has received the same messagem, agrees upon the content of the message and gives the
permission to node x of broadcasting this message. Then node x sends this constructed
signed-message to all nodes in S.
Now we describe our main algorithm, SEND, that is stated formally in Algorithm 2.
SEND calls SEND-PATH, which is formally described in Algorithm 3. In SEND-PATH,
node s sends messagem to node r through a path of unmarked nodes selected uniformly
at random. However, SEND-PATH algorithm is vulnerable to corruption. Thus, with
probability pcall, SEND calls CHECK, which detects if a message was corrupted in the
previous call to SEND-PATH, with probability pdetect.
In CHECK, the message is propagated from the leftmost quorum to the rightmost
quorum in the quorum path through a path of subquorums, where a subquorum is a
subset of unmarked nodes selected uniformly at random in a quorum.
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Algorithm 3 SEND-PATH(m, r)
Declarations: m is the message to be sent, and r is the destination.
1. Node s selects an unmarked node, q1, in Q1 uniformly at random.
2. Node s broadcasts to all nodes in Q1 the message m and q1’s ID.
3. All nodes in Q1 forward the message to node q1.
4. For i = 1, . . . , `− 1 do
(a) Node qi selects an unmarked node, qi+1, in Qi+1 uniformly at random.
(b) Node qi sends m to node qi+1.
5. Node q` broadcasts m to all nodes in Q`.
6. All nodes in Q` send m to node r.
CHECK is implemented as either CHECK1 (Algorithm 4) or CHECK2 (Algo-
rithm 5). For CHECK1, pcall = 1/(log log n)2 and pdetect = 1 − o(1), and it re-
quiresO(`(log log n)2+log n·log log n) messages and has latencyO(`). For CHECK2,
pcall = 1/(log
∗ n)2 and pdetect ≥ 1/2, and it has message costO((`+log n)(log∗ n)2)
and latency O(` log∗ n).
Unfortunately, while CHECK can determine if a corruption occurred, it does not
specify the location where the corruption occurred. Thus, if CHECK detects a corrup-
tion, UPDATE (Algorithm 6) is called. When UPDATE is called, it identifies two neigh-
boring quorumsQi andQi+1 in the path, for some 1 ≤ i < `, such that at least one pair
of nodes in these quorums is in conflict and at least one node in such pair is bad. Then
quorums Qi and Qi+1 mark these nodes and notify all other quorums that these nodes
are in. All quorums in which these nodes are notify their neighboring quorums. Recall
that if the half of nodes in any quorum have been marked, these nodes are set unmarked
in all quorums they are in, and their neighboring quorums are notified.
Moreover, we use BROADCAST in SEND-PATH and CHECK to handle any accusa-
tion in UPDATE against node s or node r. In SEND-PATH (or CHECK), we make node
s broadcast the message to all nodes in Q1 which forward the message to the selected
unmarked node (or subquorum) in Q1; and when the message is propagated to the se-
lected unmarked node (or subquorum) in Q`, the message is broadcasted to all nodes in
Q`.
Our model does not directly consider concurrency. In a real system, concurrent calls
to UPDATE that overlap at a single quorum may allow the adversary to achieve multi-
ple corruptions at the cost of a single marked bad node. However, this does not effect
correctness, and, in practice, this issue can be avoided by serializing concurrent calls
to SEND. For simplicity of presentation, we leave the concurrency aspect out of this
paper.
Throughout this paper, we let Ui be the set of unmarked nodes in Qi, and we let
|Ui| be the number of nodes in Ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
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Algorithm 4 CHECK1(m, r)
Initialization: let the subquorums S1, S2, ..., S` be initially empty.
1. Node s constructs R to be an ` by |Qmax| by log log n array of random numbers, where
|Qmax| is the maximum size of any quorum and log logn is the size of any subquorum. Note
thatR[j, k] is a multiset of log logn numbers selected uniformly at random with replacement
between 1 and k.
2. Node s sets m′ to be a message consisting of m, r, and R.
3. Node s broadcasts m′ to all nodes in Q1.
4. The nodes in Q1 calculate the nodes of S1 using the numbers in R[1, |U1|] to index U1’s
nodes sorted by their IDs.
5. The nodes in Q1 send m′ to the nodes of S1.
6. For j ← 1, . . . , `− 1 do
(a) The nodes of Sj calculate the nodes of Sj+1 using the numbers in R[j + 1, |Uj+1|] to
index Uj+1’s nodes sorted by their IDs.
(b) The nodes of Sj send m′ to all nodes of Sj+1.
7. The nodes of S` broadcast m′ to all nodes in Q`.
Note that: throughout CHECK1, if a node receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive an
expected message, then it initiates a call to UPDATE.
2.2 CHECK1
Now we describe CHECK1 that is stated formally as Algorithm 4. CHECK1 is a simpler
CHECK procedure compared to CHECK2, and, although it has a worse asymptotic
message cost, it performs well in practice.
In CHECK1, each subquorum Si has log log n nodes that are chosen uniformly at
random with replacement from the nodes in Ui in the quorum path, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `.
First, node s broadcasts the message to all nodes in Q1, which send the message to
the nodes of S1. Then the nodes of S1 forward this message to the nodes of S` through
a path of subquorums in the quorum path via all-to-all communication. Once the nodes
in S` receive the message, they broadcast this message to all nodes inQ`. Further, if any
node receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive an expected message, it initiates
a call to UPDATE.
Now we show that if the message was corrupted during the last call to SEND-PATH,
the probability that CHECK1 fails to detect a corruption is o(1) when ` = O(log n).
Lemma 1. If ` = O(log n), then CHECK1 fails to detect any message corruption with
probability o(1).
Proof. CHECK1 succeeds in detecting the message corruption if every subquorum has
at least one good node. We know that at least 1/2-fraction of the nodes in any quorum
are unmarked, then the probability that an unmarked bad node is selected uniformly
at random is at most 1/4. Thus the probability of any subquorum having only bad
nodes is at most (1/4)log logn = 1/ log2 n. Union-bounding over all ` subquorums, the
probability of CHECK1 failing is at most `/ log2 n. For ` = O(log n), the probability
that CHECK1 fails is o(1). uunionsq
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2.3 CHECK2
Algorithm 5 CHECK2(m, r)
Initializations: node s generates public/private key pair kp, ks to be used in this procedure; also
let the subquorums S1, S2, ..., S` be initially empty.
for i← 1, . . . , 4 log∗ n do
1. Node s constructs R to be an ` by |Qmax| array of random numbers, where |Qmax| is the
maximum size of any quorum. Note that R[j, k] is a uniformly random number between
1 and k.
2. Node s sets m′ to be m, kp, r, and R signed by ks.
3. Node s broadcasts m′ to all nodes in Q1.
4. The nodes in Q1 calculate the node, x1 ∈ U1, to be added to S1 using the number
R[1, |U1|] to index U1’s nodes sorted by their IDs.
5. The nodes in Q1 send m′ to the nodes of S1.
6. For j ← 1, . . . , `− 1 do
(a) All i nodes in Sj calculate the node, xj+1 ∈ Uj+1, to be added to Sj+1 using the
number R[j + 1, |Uj+1|] to index Uj+1’s nodes sorted by their IDs.
(b) The nodes in Sj send m′ to node xj+1.
(c) Node xj+1 sends m′ to all the nodes in Sj+1.
7. The nodes in S` broadcast m′ to all nodes in Q`.
end for
Note that: throughout this procedure, if a node has previously received kp, then it verifies each
subsequent message with it; also if a node receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive and
verify an expected message, then it initiates a call to UPDATE.
In this section, we describe CHECK2 algorithm, which is stated formally as Al-
gorithm 5. Firstly, node s generates a public/private key pair kp, ks to let the nodes
verify any message received. Then CHECK2 runs for 4 log∗ n rounds, and has a subset
Sj ⊂ Uj for each quorum Qj in the quorum path, for 1 ≤ j ≤ `. Every Sj is an incre-
mental subquorum, where each Sj is initially empty; and in each round, an unmarked
node, xj , is selected uniformly at random from all nodes in Uj and is added to Sj , for
all 1 ≤ j ≤ `.
In each round, node s broadcasts the message to all nodes in Q1, which forward
such message to the nodes of S1. Then for all 1 ≤ j < `, all nodes in Sj send the
message to node xj+1, which forwards the message to all nodes in Sj+1. Finally, all
nodes in S` broadcast the message to all nodes in Q`.
Note that if any node receives inconsistent messages or fails to receive and verify
any expected message in any round, it initiates a call to UPDATE.
An example run of CHECK2 is illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure, there is a
column for each quorum in the quorum path and a row for each round of CHECK2. For
a given row and column, there is a G or B in that position depending on whether the
node selected in that particular round and that particular quorum is good (G) or bad (B).
Recall that the adversary knows CHECK2 algorithm, but in any round, the adversary
does not know which nodes will be selected to participate for any subsequent round. The
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G B G B B B B B B B B B B B G B G B
B G G G B G B G B B B G B B B G G G
Received m' Didn't receive m'
G B G G G B B B B G B B G G B B G B
B G B B B G G G B G G G B B G G B G
Fig. 1. Example run of CHECK2
adversary’s strategy is to maintain an interval of bad nodes in each row to corrupt (or
drop) the message so that CHECK2 will not be able to detect the corruption.
In Figure 1, the intervals maintained by the adversary are outlined by a left and a
right bar in each row; where the best interest of the adversary is to maintain the longest
interval of bad nodes in the first row. The left bar in each row specifies the rightmost
subquorum in which there is some good node that receives m′. The right bar in each
row specifies the leftmost subquorum in which there is some good node that does not
receive m′.
Note that, as rounds progress, the left bar can never move leftwards, because a node
that has already received kp will call UPDATE unless it receives messages signed with
kp for all subsequent rounds. Note further that the right bar can never move rightwards,
since the nodes of each subset Sj send m′ to the node xj+1, which forwards such
message to all nodes that are currently in Sj+1, for 1 ≤ j < `. Finally, when these two
bars meet, a corruption is detected.
Intuitively, the reason CHECK2 requires only 4 log∗ n rounds is because of a prob-
abilistic result on the maximum length run in a sequence of coin tosses. In particular, if
we have a coin that takes on value “B” with probability at most 1/4, and value “G” with
probability at least 3/4, and we toss it x times, then the expected length of the longest
run of B’s is log x. Thus, if in some round, the distance between the left bar and the
right bar is x, we expect in the next round this distance will shrink to log x. Intuitively,
we might expect that, if the quorum path is of length `, then O(log∗ `) rounds will suf-
fice before the distance shrinks to 0. This intuition is formalized in Lemmas 2 and 3 of
Section 3.
In contrast to CHECK1, even though all nodes in column 9 are bad in Figure 1,
CHECK2 algorithm handles this case since the good node in row 3 and column 10
receives the message m′.
2.4 UPDATE
When a message corruption occurs and CHECK detects this corruption, UPDATE is
called. Now the task of UPDATE is to 1) determine the location in which the corruption
occurred; 2) mark the nodes that are in conflict. The UPDATE algorithm is described
formally as Algorithm 6. When UPDATE starts, all nodes in each quorum in the quorum
path are notified.
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Algorithm 6 UPDATE
1. The node, x, making the call to UPDATE broadcasts this fact to all nodes in its quorum, Q′,
along with all the messages that x has received during this call to SEND. The nodes in Q′
verify that x received inconsistent messages before proceeding.
2. The quorum Q′ propagates the fact that a call to UPDATE is occurring, via all-to-all com-
munication, to all quorums Q1, Q2, . . . , Q`.
3. Each node involved in the last call to SEND-PATH or CHECK, except node s and node r,
compiles all messages they have received (and from whom) in that last call, and broadcasts
all these messages to all nodes in its quorum and the neighboring quorums.
4. Each node involved in the last call to SEND-PATH, except node s and node r, broadcasts all
messages they have sent (and to whom) in that last call, to all nodes in its quorum and the
neighboring quorums.
5. A node v is in conflict with a node u if:
(a) node u was scheduled to send a message to node v at some point in the last call to
SEND-PATH or CHECK; and
(b) node v does not receive an expected message from node u in step 3 or step 4, or node
v receives a message in step 3 or step 4 that is different than the message that it has
received from node u in the last call to SEND-PATH or CHECK.
6. For each pair of nodes, (u, v), that are in conflict in (Qk, Qk+1), for 1 ≤ k < `:
(a) node v sends a conflict message “(u,v)” to all nodes in Qv ,
(b) each node in Qv forwards this conflict message to all nodes in Qv and all nodes in Qu,
(c) quorum Qu (or Qv) sends the conflict message to all other quorums that node u (or v)
is in, and
(d) each quorum that node u or node v is in sends such conflict message to its neighboring
quorums.
7. Each node that receives this conflict message mark the nodes u and v.
8. If the half of nodes in any quorum have been marked, they are set unmarked in all quorums
these nodes are in, and their neighboring quorums are notified.
To determine the location in which the corruption occurred, each node previously
involved in SEND-PATH or CHECK broadcasts to all nodes in its quorum and the neigh-
boring quorums all messages they have received in the previous call to SEND-PATH or
CHECK. Moreover, to announce the unmarked nodes that are selected uniformly at ran-
dom in the last call to SEND-PATH, every node involved in the last call to SEND-PATH,
broadcasts all messages they have sent (and to whom) in such call, to all nodes in its
quorum and the neighboring quorums.
We say that a node v is in conflict with a node u if 1) node u was scheduled to send
a message to node v at some point in the previous call to SEND-PATH or CHECK; and
2) node v does not receive an expected message from node u in this call to UPDATE,
or node v receives a message in this UPDATE that is different than the message that it
has received from node u in the previous call to SEND-PATH or CHECK.
For each pair of nodes, (u, v), that are in conflict in quorums (Qk, Qk+1) for 1 ≤
k < `, these two quorums send a conflict message “(u,v)” to all quorums in which
node u or node v is and to all neighboring quorums to mark these nodes. Recall that
if the half of nodes in any quorum are marked, this quorum notifies all other quorums
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in which these nodes are via all-to-all communication to unmark such nodes, and their
neighboring quorums are notified as well.
3 Analysis
In this section, we prove the lemmas required for Theorem 1. Throughout this section,
SEND-PATH calls CHECK2. Also we let all logarithms be base 2.
Lemma 2. When a coin is tossed x times independently given that each coin has a
tail with probability at most 1/4, then the probability of having any substring of length
max(1, log x) being all tails is at most 1/2.
Proof. The probability of a specific substring of length log x being all tails is(
1
4
)log x
=
1
x2
.
Union bounding over all possible substrings of length log x, then the probability of any
all-tailed substring existing is at most x 1x2 ; or equivalently, for x ≥ 2, 1x ≤ 12 ; and for
x = 1, the probability of having a substring of max(1, log x) tail is trivially 1/4. uunionsq
The next lemma shows that the algorithm CHECK2 catches corruptions with prob-
ability at least 1/2.
Lemma 3. Assume some node selected uniformly at random in the last call to SEND-
PATH has corrupted a message. Then when the algorithm CHECK2 is called, with
probability at least 1/2, some node will call UPDATE.
Lemma 4. If some node selected uniformly at random in the last call to SEND-PATH
has corrupted a message, then the algorithm UPDATE will identify a pair of neighbor-
ing quorums Qj and Qj+1, for some 1 ≤ j < `, such that at least one pair of nodes in
these quorums is in conflict and at least one node in such pair is bad.
Proof. First we show that if a pair of nodes x and y is in conflict, then at least one
of them is bad. Assume not. Then both x and y are good. Then node x would have
truthfully reported what it received; any message that x received would have been sent
directly to y; and y would have truthfully reported what it received from x. But this is
a contradiction, since for x and y to be in conflict, y must have reported that it received
from x something different than what x reported receiving.
Now consider the case where a selected unmarked bad node corrupted a message
in the last call to SEND-PATH. By the definition of corruption, there must be two good
nodes qj and qk such that j < k and qj received the message m′ sent by node s, and
qk did not. We now show that some pair of nodes between qj and qk will be in conflict.
Assume this is not the case. Then for all x, where j ≤ x < k, nodes qx and qx+1 are
not in conflict. But then, since node qj received the message m′, and there are no pairs
of nodes in conflict, it must be the case that the node qk received the message m′. This
is a contradiction. Thus, UPDATE will find two nodes that are in conflict, and at least
one of them will be bad.
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Now we prove that at least one pair of nodes is found to be in conflict as a result
of calling UPDATE. Assume that no pair of nodes is in conflict. Then for every pair of
nodes x and y, such that x was scheduled to send a message to y during any round i of
CHECK2, x and y must have reported that they received the same message in round i. In
particular, this implies via induction, that for every round i, for all j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ `,
all nodes in the sets Sj must have broadcasted that they received the message m′ that
was initially sent by node s in round i. But if this is the case, the node x that initially
called UPDATE would have received no inconsistent messages. This is a contradiction
since in such a case, node x would have been unsuccessful in trying to initiate a call to
UPDATE. Thus, some pair of nodes must be found to be in conflict, and at least one of
them is bad. uunionsq
The next lemma bounds the number of times that UPDATE must be called before
all bad nodes are marked.
Lemma 5. UPDATE is called at most 3t/2 times before all bad nodes are marked.
Proof. By Lemma 4, if a message corruption occurred in the last call to SEND-PATH,
and is caught by CHECK2, then UPDATE is called. UPDATE identifies at least one pair
of nodes that are in conflict.
Now let g be the number of good nodes that are marked, and let b be the number of
bad nodes that are marked. Also let f(g, b) = b− g/3.
For each corruption caught, at least one bad node is marked, and so f(g, b) increases
by at least 2/3 since b increases by at least 1 and g increases by at most 1. When a 1/2-
fraction of nodes in any quorum Q of size |Q| are unmarked, f(g, b) further increases
by at least 0 since g decreases by at least 3|Q|8 and b decreases by at most
|Q|
8 .
Hence, f(g, b) is monotonically increasing by at least 2/3 for each corruption caught.
When all bad nodes are marked, f(g, b) ≤ t. Therefore, after at most 3t/2 calls to UP-
DATE, all bad nodes are marked. uunionsq
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Setup
In this section, we empirically compare the message cost and the fraction of messages
corrupted of two algorithms via simulation. The first algorithm we simulate is no-self-
healing algorithm from [5]. This algorithm has no self-healing properties, and simply
uses all-to-all communication between quorums that are connected in a butterfly net-
work. The second algorithm is self-healing, wherein we apply our self-healing algo-
rithm in the butterfly networks using CHECK1.
In our experiments, we consider two butterfly network sizes: n = 14,116 and n =
30,509, where ` = blog nc − 2, the quorum size is b4 log nc and the subquorum size is
blog log nc. Moreover, we do our experiments for several fractions of bad nodes such
as f equal to 1/8, 1/16, 1/32 and 1/64, where f = t/n.
Our simulations consist of a sequence of calls to SEND over the network, given a
pair of nodes s, r, chosen uniformly at random, such that node s sends a message to node
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r. We simulate an adversary who chooses at the beginning of each simulation a fixed
number of nodes to control uniformly at random without replacement. Our adversary
attempts to corrupt messages between nodes whenever possible. Aside from attempting
to corrupt messages, the adversary performs no other attacks.
4.2 Results
The results of our experiments are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Our results highlight two
strengths of our self-healing algorithms (self-healing) when compared to algorithms
without self-healing (no-self-healing). First, the message cost per SEND decreases as
the total number of calls to SEND increases, as illustrated in Figure 2. Second, for
a fixed number of calls to SEND, the message cost per SEND decreases as the total
number of bad nodes decreases, as shown in Figure 2 as well. In particular, when there
are no bad nodes, self-healing has dramatically less message cost than no-self-healing.
Figure 2 shows that for n = 14,116, the number of messages per SEND for no-self-
healing is 30,516; and for self-healing, it is 525. Hence, the message cost is reduced
by a factor of 58. Also for n = 30,509, the number of messages per SEND for no-self-
healing is 39,170; and for self-healing, it is 562; which implies that the message cost is
reduced by a factor of 70.
In Figure 3, no-self-healing has 0 corruptions; however, for self-healing, the frac-
tion of messages corrupted per SEND decreases as the total number of calls to SEND
increases. Also for a fixed number of calls to SEND, the fraction of messages corrupted
per SEND decreases as the total number of bad nodes decreases.
Furthermore, in Figure 3, for each network, given the size and the fraction of bad
nodes, if we integrate the corresponding curve, we get the total number of times that a
message can be corrupted in calls to SEND in this network. These experiments show
that the total number of message corruptions is at most 3t(log log n)2.
Fig. 2. # Messages per SEND versus # calls to SEND, for n = 14,116 and n = 30,509.
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Fig. 3. Fraction of messages corrupted versus # calls to SEND, for n = 14,116 and n = 30,509.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented algorithms that can significantly reduce communication cost in
attack-resistant peer-to-peer networks. The price we pay for this improvement is the
possibility of message corruption. In particular, if there are t ≤ n/8 bad nodes in the
network, our algorithm allows O(t(log∗ n)2) message transmissions to be corrupted in
expectation.
Many problems remain. First, it seems unlikely that the smallest number of cor-
ruptions allowable by an attack-resistant algorithm with optimal message complexity is
O(t(log∗ n)2). Can we improve this to O(t) or else prove a non-trivial lower bound?
Second, can we apply techniques in this paper to problems more general that enabling
secure communication? For example, can we create self-healing algorithms for dis-
tributed computation with Byzantine faults? Finally, can we optimize constants and
make use of heuristic techniques in order to significantly improve our algorithms’ em-
pirical performance?
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A Appendix - Deferred Proofs
Lemma 3. Assume some node selected uniformly at random in the last call to SEND-
PATH has corrupted a message. Then when the algorithm CHECK2 is called, with prob-
ability at least 1/2, some node will call UPDATE.
Proof. This proof makes use of the following two propositions, but first we define the
critical intervals in CHECK2.
Definition 1. We say that there is a (j, k) critical interval in round i if a reliable trans-
mittal in round i from a good node in Qj to a good node in Qk will result in a call to
UPDATE.
Proposition 1 If (j, k) is a critical interval in round i then ∃j′, k′, j ≤ j′ ≤ k′ ≤ k
such that (j′, k′) is a critical interval in round i+ 1.
To prove this proposition, note that the good nodes inQj that are chosen by CHECK2
in rounds i or less know s’s public key, kp. Thus they must receive uncorrupted mes-
sages signed by s’s private key, ks, in all rounds subsequent to i; otherwise, UPDATE
will be called.
Proposition 2 Fix a round i + 1 in CHECK2, and let (j′, k′) be a critical interval in
round i + 1 that minimizes the value k′ − j′. Then in round i + 1, UPDATE is called
unless all nodes that are chosen between quorums Qj′ and Qk′ are bad.
To show Proposition 2, assume by way of contradiction that it is false. Then there
exists x′ such that j′ < x′ < k′, where the node p′ chosen in round i+1 atQx′ is good.
There are two cases for what happens in round i+ 1:
– Case 1: The node p′ receives the message m′ sent by node s. But then (j′, x′) is a
critical interval in round i+1 and x′−j′ < k′−j′. This contradicts the assumption
that the indices j′ and k′ had the minimal distance among all critical intervals in
round i+ 1.
– Case 2: The node p′ does not receive the message m′ sent by node s. But then
(x′, k′) is a critical interval in round i+1 and k′−x′ < k′− j′. This again contra-
dicts the assumption that the indices j′ and k′ had the minimal distance among all
critical intervals in round i+ 1.
Now we can use these two propositions to prove the lemma. Let Xi be an indicator
random variable that it is equal to 1 if (k′ − j′) ≤ log(k − j) and 0 otherwise, where
(j, k) is a critical interval in round i and (j′, k′) is a critical interval in round i + 1.
Recall that at least 1/2-fraction of the nodes in any quorum are unmarked, then the
probability that an unmarked bad node is selected uniformly at random is at most 1/4.
By Lemma 2, the probability of having any substring of length max(1, log x) bad nodes
in a sequence of x nodes selected independently is at most 1/2. Thus, each Xi is 1 with
probability at least 1/2. We require at least log∗ n of the Xi random variables to be 1 in
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order for some node to call UPDATE.3 Let X =
∑4 log∗ n
i=1 Xi. Then E(X) = 2 log
∗ n,
and since the Xi’s are independent, by Chernoff bounds,
Pr (X < (1− δ)2 log∗ n) ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)2 log∗ n
.
For δ = 12 and n > 16, Pr (X < log
∗ n) ≤
(
e
1
2
( 32 )
3
2
)2 log∗ n
< 12 .
Thus the probability that CHECK2 succeeds in finding a corruption and calling
UPDATE is at least 1/2. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show the message complexity and the latency of our
algorithms. By Lemma 5, the number of calling UPDATE is at most 3t/2. Thus the
resource cost of all calls to UPDATE are bounded as the number of calls to SEND
grows large. Therefore, for the amortized cost, we consider only the cost of the calls to
SEND-PATH and CHECK2.
When sending a message through ` quorums, SEND-PATH has message cost O(`+
log n) and latency O(`). CHECK2 has a message cost of O((`+log n)(log∗ n)2) and a
latency ofO(` log∗ n), but CHECK2 is called only with probability 1/(log∗ n)2. Hence,
the call to SEND has amortized expected message cost O(` + log n) and amortized
expected latency O(`).
More specifically, if we perform any number of message sends through quorum
paths, where `M is the longest such path, and L is the sum of the quorums traversed
in all such paths, then the expected total number of messages sent will be O(L + t ·
(`M log
2 n+ log5 n)), and the latency is O(t · `M ). This is true since each call to UP-
DATE has message cost O(`M log2 n+ log5 n) and latency O(`M ), where 1) the node,
x, making the call to UPDATE broadcasts its reason of calling UPDATE to all nodes
in its quorum, this has message cost O(log n) and latency O(1); 2) all nodes in every
quorum in the quorum path are notified via all-to-all communication when UPDATE is
called, these notifications have a message cost ofO(`M log2 n) and a latency ofO(`M );
3) UPDATE has O(log∗ n) broadcasts over at most `M quorums, that has message cost
O(`M log
∗ n · log n) and latency O(1); 4) the message cost when all nodes in Q1 and
Q` broadcast is O(log2 n) with latency O(1); 5) for marking a pair of nodes that are
in conflict, the message cost is O(log3 n) and the latency is O(1); and 6) we know
that marking a pair of nodes that are in conflict could cause O(log n) quorums to be
unmarked; and unmarking half of nodes in a quorum has a message cost of O(log4 n).
Then unmarking O(log n) quorums has a message cost of O(log5 n) and a latency of
O(1).
Recall that by Lemma 5, the number of times CHECK2 must catch corruptions
before all bad nodes are marked is at most 3t/2. In addition, if a bad node caused a
corruption during a call to SEND-PATH, then by Lemmas 3 and 4, with probability at
least 1/2, CHECK2 will catch it. As a consequence, it will call UPDATE, which marks
the nodes that are in conflict. UPDATE is thus called with probability 1/(log∗ n)2, so
the expected total number of corruptions is at most 3t(log∗ n)2.
3 Here we assume ` ≤ n. However, we can achieve the same asymptotic results assuming that `
is bounded by a polynomial in n.
